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 IS CHINA STEALING OUR TECH? A LOOK INTO THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN US-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS 
 
This thesis aims to further the current scholarship on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
and their effects on international trade and the US-China trade relationship more specifically. 
The main analysis of this thesis is a quantitative cross-country analysis of over 100 countries to 
see how IPR plays a role in international trade, while analyzing how the Sino-US trade 
relationship fits into larger trends. This thesis aims to answer the questions as follows: What are 
the current policies surrounding Intellectual Property Rights between China and the US? Does 
increasing the strength of IPR laws influence imports? Does the strength of a country’s legal 
environment influence imports? What is significant about this relationship in terms of current 
Sino-US trade relations? I argue that China’s IPR strength has increased over time which has a 
partial effect on the increase in international trade with the US. My results show that on average 
both an increase in the strength of a country’s IPR laws and legal environment is associated with 
an increase in imports.  
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I. Acknowledgements1 
II. Introduction 
“China’s taking all our jobs!” “They’re screwing us over!” “China is a threat; we’re 
going to win the trade war.” Chances are most US citizens have heard something along the lines 
of these phrases in social media, news, or everyday life. Donald Trump vowed in his campaign 
to address China’s role as a “currency manipulator” and the impact it has on the US (“Trump’s 
Campaign Promises”). For decades, according to the World Bank, China has been gaining on the 
US in terms of GDP, military strength, technology, etc. Their GDP growth rate has been nearly 
10% every year, the fastest expanding major economy in history, which has lifted over 800 
million people out of poverty. Although their growth rate has been slowly falling since 2010, 
their percent of the world GDP has reached almost 20%, surpassing the US’ share of around 15% 
in 2013. US citizens are noticing China’s growing influence even in everyday life, mainly “Made 
 
1 I would like to express my gratitude for all those who have aided me through this rigorous 
and challenging process of writing my Senior Honors Thesis. First, I would like to say thank 
you to my thesis advisor Professor Meina Cai. Since taking her class on East Asian Political 
Economy, she has been one of my biggest supporters, always pushing me to do better and 
reach for the highest. While helping me to write my thesis, she provided guidance, 
constructive criticism, and a sense of clarity when I felt lost. I would also like to thank 
Professor Matthew Singer who took on a new position of teaching the POLS honors Thesis 
class and hit the ground running. Professor Singer helped narrow down my topic, talked 
through all the challenging problems that came up, and overall gave our class an incredible 
experience I am so humbled and glad I was able to take part in.  
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in China.” Nowadays, one cannot go a day without encountering a product that was made in 
China. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has been challenging the perceived Chinese threat 
by engaging in tariff battles with China, attempting to decrease the massive trade deficit US has 
with China. Overall, tensions have been notably rising between China and the US because the 
Chinese have developed into the international manufacturing powerhouse whose sheer output the 
US cannot contend with. With this perpetually competitive and tense political economy, 
international firms have many factors to consider when choosing to do business in the US-China 
trade relationship, one pertinent factor is the host country’s Intellectual Property Rights.  
 A big concern multinational corporations and nations should have when they enter a 
foreign country’s market is whether their ideas, technology, plans, processes, and other original 
creations will be protected from theft. Intellectual property theft is essentially copying other 
people’s inventions and ideas in a business setting, enabling the thief to bypass the costs, the 
time of researching, and the time of developing the technology themselves. The rights associated 
with intellectual property include copyrights, trademarks, and patents which prohibit all other 
individuals or companies to copy, recreate, or imitate your new idea or product for their own 
commercial gain. Thus, international organizations and multinational corporations may take a 
country’s Intellectual Property Rights strength into account before entering their market. Despite 
China’s comparatively weaker enforcement, the fact that it’s improving and growing, coupled 
with low labor costs and other economic incentives for commercial success, there is the potential 
for IPR to be a driving factor in the growth in the Sino-US trade relationship.  
China has overtime enacted various Intellectual Property Right laws as they have grown 
in the international economy, however enforcement of those new laws in Chinese society has 
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proven difficult. Not surprising for a developing nation, the enforcement problems stem from 
failures in not only the legal system but also the “…corresponding economic, political, social, 
and cultural institutions. For example, these boundaries include local protectionism, low public 
IPR awareness, a shortage of indigenous technology, and also shortcomings in the judicial 
system,” (Cao 2014). Primarily, Chinese IPR enforcements lack consistency between the 
national and provincial levels, in addition to having separate administrative and legal 
departments that handle cases of IPR theft. This results in a lack of consensus interpreting their 
newly enacted IPR laws for a society that not too long ago had no notion of private property 
altogether. Despite the lack of IPR enforcement of Western counterparts, China has still made 
serious improvements in IPR enforcement in addition to their constant updating of IPR laws. In 
the Beijing IPR court specifically, there have been major improvements in the quality of IPR 
judges who are increasingly receiving specialized training. The IPR courts are awarding higher 
damages for IPR theft and have decided in 2015 alone three times the number of cases decided 
by the Beijing IPR court in 2014 (Huang 2017). Along with these improvements, China has seen 
a rapid exponential growth in patent applications as seen in Figure 1, practically doubling to a 
total of 1.1 million patents filed in 2015. This growth in patents and improving IPR enforcement 
could be an indicator for multinational corporations and domestic Chinese firms’ growing 
confidence and desire for IPR protection.  
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Figure 1: Annual Invention Patent Applications of Several different countries’ patent 
offices from 1995-2015 
 
Source: Huang (2017) 
 
This thesis aims to further the current literature about Chinese Intellectual Property 
Rights and analyze the impact they have had on domestic and foreign companies in China. In 
light of China’s growing economy, the current trade war, and the rising tensions between US and 
China, Intellectual Property Rights helps explain one aspect of this constantly evolving 
relationship. First, I will synthesize the current and major literatures discussing Intellectual 
Property Rights and scholars that more specifically focus on Chinese IPR. This will show where 
some gaps in the literature are, allowing me to expand upon past scholars’ works. Second, I will 
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add to the current literature by preforming a large-n quantitative cross-country analysis of the 
IPR-trade relationship using a self-compiled dataset. Third, I will systematically go through each 
part of the results and what implications those results have on the Sino-US relationship. Lastly, I 
will conclude with the overall importance of this research, how this research can help future 
scholars tackle IPR related questions, and possibilities for future studies.  
III. Background 
Before getting into the major literature on IPR, some background on the US-China Trade 
relationship and the development of Chinese IPR is essential in obtaining a deep understanding 
of this research problem. Since initiating market reforms in the 1980’s, systematically switching 
from a centrally planned to a market-based economy has allowed Chinese companies to 
capitalize on the country’s main advantage in the international economy: labor costs. Labor in 
China costs a fraction, less than 10% of what the hourly wage is for the average US manufacture 
worker (Liu 2018). As a result, moving production to China has become a common strategic 
move for multinational corporations seeking to minimize the cost of production. However, low 
labor costs is just one out of many economic factors that have led to China’s position in the 
global supply chain. Nonetheless, producing both Chinese domestic corporations and 
multinational enterprises’ products has resulted in China becoming a manufacturing powerhouse 
in the world economy. On the road to becoming that powerhouse, the US has become one of 
China’s biggest international economic partners, whose relationship has only grown since 
President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. As seen in Figure 2, The Sino-US trade 
relationship grew quickly to 4,811,270,000 USD by 1980. This visit was the catalyst needed to 
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normalize diplomatic relations by 1979 which opened the gates to drastic and exponential growth 
in trade between China and the US.  
Figure 2: Sino-US Trade, 1971-1980 (measured in millions of 2010 USD) 
 
Source: Wang (2010) 
Following China’s economic reforms in the 1980’s, major US firms entered China by 
joint venture with Chinese companies or government agencies. These firms included: Coca-Cola; 
American Express; American Motors; AMF, Inc.; General Foods; Beatrice; Gillette; Pepsi-Cola; 
Eastman Kodak; AT&T and many others. During the 1980’s their economic relationship grew 
annually around 44% each year, which was the beginning of the trade imbalance being shifted to 
China (Mertha 2005). With the immense growth, by 1984 the US was already China’s third 
largest trading partner, while China was the US’ fourteenth largest partner (Wang 2010). 
Although the trade volume was beneficial to both countries especially the US with regards to the 
Cold War necessitating massive amounts of capital, this sustained growth was coupled by US 
anxiety over the beginnings of a trade deficit with China. This deficit would soon snowball to 
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over 200 billion USD by mid-2000’s and would rapidly become a major point of friction in later 
years. Even so, China would soon become the US’ second largest trading partner by 2005 with 
their combined trade volume reaching levels of around 300 billion USD. The US exported 
mainly raw materials and sophisticated technology while China exported both common 
commercial goods like toys and power equipment (Wang 2010). During this time of economic 
expansion in their trade relationship, only providing a simplification of decades of complicated 
political and economic history, one important factor along the way has been the development of 
China’s Intellectual Property Rights.  
Figure 3: Sino-US Trade, 1981-1990 (measured in millions of 2010 USD) 
 
Source: Wang (2010) 
Beginning in 1982, China established The Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, their first modern legal system for protecting Intellectual Property Rights. According to a 
brief history of Chinese IPR written by Huang (2017), China developed patent laws in 1984. 
Then in 1987, China entered IPR into its basic civil law for the rights of citizens, created 
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Copyright Law in 1990, and made further additions throughout the 1990’s. The addition of 
Intellectual Property laws into the Chinese legal system happened simultaneously as they entered 
several international organizations and treaties. China’s IPR was again revamped in 2000 so that 
it could join the World Trade Organization in 2001, abiding by the WTO’s agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Awokuse 2010b).  
Since then, the US has consistently been pushing China to increase their Intellectual 
Property Right strength in written laws and especially in enforcement. In April of 2007, the US 
formally requested dialogue with China concerning China’s failure to adhere to the TRIPS 
guidelines for IPR. The US filed a complaint with the WTO against China regarding the TRIPS 
agreement. Their reasons being that US firms report having significant economic losses due to 
local companies stealing their intellectual property and not being properly reprimanded by the 
Chinese authorities (Huang 2017). The formal complaint filed by the US had the following 
concerns: “(1) The high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual 
property area, (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose of infringing 
goods seized at the border, (3) the denial of copyright protection to works that have not been 
authorized for publication or dissemination within China, and (4) the unavailability of criminal 
procedures and penalties for infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution, 
but not both” (Yu 2011). The WTO compiled a panel to address the complaint and created a 
report explaining their final decisions. In the report, WTO sided with China on the first claim, 
sided with US on the third claim, had a split decision on the 2nd and 4th claim. Right after 
publication, both countries called the results a victory even though the report was not solely one-
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sided (Yu 2011). To this day, Intellectual Property laws have been a talking point for Sino-US 
diplomatic negotiations on trade and will continue to be for years to come. 
IV. Literature Review 
Knowing that IPR is a controversial issue for the Sino-US relationship, a more in-depth 
understanding about IPR and how scholars have studied this issue is essential. Intellectual 
Property Rights can generally be split up into three different categories: patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks. Patents protect inventions and products, copyrights protect creative intellectual 
ideas, and trademarks cover commercial logos, phrases, and words associated with a company’s 
product or service. These forms of Intellectual Property Rights give the owner the legal right to 
exclude anyone else from making, using, selling, and importing the owner’s invention for a 
certain number of years. Essentially, this gives the owner a limited monopoly period to use their 
invention or idea before it enters the public domain. Those are the basic principles of Intellectual 
Property Rights according to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Additionally, 
firms doing business internationally who want to protect their technology and ideas in several 
countries will need patents in each country they are operating in to maximize protection because 
patents do not have international coverage. This complication makes it difficult for scholars to 
analyze the relationship between IPR and trade because there can be vastly different laws, 
interpretations, and enforcement practices between countries.  
Previous studies have measured and defined IPR strength as their independent variable in 
a variety of different ways including the number of patent applications, IPR indexes, 
contents/wording of IPR legislation, and various kinds of enforcement. For example, Smith 
(2001, 2002) uses cross-country data on the strength of foreign patent rights while Awokuse 
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(2010a, 2015) and Falvey (2009) use an IPR index generated by Ginarte and Park (1997). Their 
index uses data from 110 countries for the period 1960-1990 to determine how strongly patent 
rights will be protected. Li (2015) separates IPR into its explicit legislation and the details of its 
enforcement. Li measures the legislation strength similarly to other IPR indexes like Ginarte and 
Park (1997) by summating several factors including: the extent to which different inventions are 
covered, membership in international agreements, provisions for loss of protection, and results of 
IPR court cases. Overall, most political science studies on IPR strength are focused on patent 
rights in target countries and or use an index synthesizing the legislation, the enforcement, or 
both in conjunction.  
In addition to variation in how IPR strength is measured as an independent variable, trade 
relationships are measured just as variably throughout IPR scholarship to include studies on 
affiliate sales, licensing, innovation, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as imports and 
exports. These dependent variables are major modes of transactions for international businesses 
and are helpful for analyzing the nuances of IPR strength’s effects on trade (Awokuse 2010b). 
Affiliate sales refers to firms setting up a proxy in a foreign nation to sell their products while 
licensing refers to giving another company permission to produce and sell their product with a 
specified payment. IPR strength’s effect on innovation as studied by Cho et. al. (2017) shows us 
that the number of patent applications from a company can indicate its level of innovation. They 
found that increased IPR strength does not increase innovation, but the effect is much less for 
international firms than domestic firms. Foreign Direct Investment is simply an investment by a 
foreign company in a domestic company to gain partial or even full ownership of the domestic 
company. To analyze participation of a foreign firm in a country necessitates considering these 
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other forms of servicing a foreign market. Awokuse (2015), finds that the increasing Intellectual 
Property Right strength from 1994-2006 has a positive relationship with US FDI. These 
variations in how IPR scholars measure and explain the trends in trade are connected to each 
other through some essential ideas in economics.  
There are two main economic models that IPR scholars consider when analyzing IPR’s 
impact on trade, no matter if they are focusing on legislation, enforcement, or another aspect. 
The two most notable are the market power and market expansion effects (Maskus and Penubarti 
1995). Each frame explains why an increase in IPR protection can either have a positive or 
negative relationship with exports and imports depending on the imitative ability of the 
importing country (Smith 2001, 2002). Firms have a tradeoff to manage between greater market 
power or market size, choosing market power usually causes a decrease in output while choosing 
greater market size results in increasing output. The market power concept refers to when a firm 
can raise its prices without consequence because of little competition or ability of competitors to 
produce similar products. IPR can create a market power effect because of the monopoly power 
given to a firm for a limited time. When a firm has a monopoly over a product, with no 
competition from other firms creating substitutive products, that firm can raise its prices without 
losing any customers because customers have no other options. On the other hand, the market 
expansion effect is stronger for countries with higher imitation abilities because increased IPR 
protection makes it harder to imitate and firms tend to increase their output to occupy more of 
the market. Essentially, if no one else can sell a product similar to yours, you can also increase 
output as long as you have monopoly power over the market (Smith 2002). 
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 Many scholars have used these two effects in their analysis of IPR on bilateral trade to 
explain the interaction relationship of IPR and bilateral trade. The market power decreases trade 
while market expansion increases it. Market power is shown to have a larger effect in countries 
with weaker imitative abilities while market expansion affects countries with strong imitative 
ability when IPR strength increases (Awokuse 2010a, 2015, Smith 2001, 2002, Falvey 2009). A 
country’s imitative ability is its capability to copy another firm’s technology or manufacturing 
process. Therefore, if a developing country has gone through or is going through 
industrialization and has a higher quality of education, then it is likely to have strong imitative 
abilities because people have more potential to imitate foreign technology, create their own 
version, and integrate those ideas into their domestic products. This imitative ability is measured 
by R&D expenditure as a percent of GDP, per capita number of R&D scientists, technicians, 
engineers, and educational level (Smith 2002). Higher R&D expenditure and specialists’ 
education level equates to a higher imitative ability of that country. Essentially, countries that 
struggle to invest in R&D and have low education levels are considered to have weak imitative 
abilities. As a result, Awokuse (2010b, 2015), Smith (2001,2002), and Falvey (2009) agree that 
the market power effect dominates in countries with weaker imitative ability because one firm 
with monopoly power can decrease output and raise prices while maintaining customers because 
customers have no other options. On the other hand, the market expansion effect is dominant in 
importing to countries that have a higher level of imitative ability because increased IPR 
protection makes that imitation harder and firms can increase output if they have monopoly 
power from patents. Overall, scholars tend to use the market power and expansion effects in 
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terms of imitative ability to act as a framework to explain their findings because IPR protection’s 
impact on trade varies drastically for different countries and industries. 
In studying the contradictory market power and expansion effects, scholars tend to 
choose either a large group of countries or a specific relationship or country to focus their study. 
Studies done on a large group of countries, utilizing IPR indexes, have found wide variation in 
the effects of IPR on trade, FDI, and innovation. This variation has led scholars to believe effects 
of IPR on trade and other dependent variables must be isolated and looked at on case-by-case 
scenarios. For example, the index generated by Ginarte and Park (1997) uses a scoring method 
that places weights for various criteria in an arbitrary manner. The depth and breadth of their 
index has been vital to the study of IPR; however, it might not be enough to explain how changes 
in patent laws through the years affect a specific country’s economic viability (Awokuse 2010a). 
In IPR scholarship, there is a wide variation in the chosen subjects to study, whether it be a group 
of countries or a specific country.  
Despite the variation in chosen countries and target industries, IPR scholarship has 
consistently stayed at a higher level of aggregation which leads this thesis to continue in a similar 
manner. Studies looking at the effects of strengthening IPR on exports and imports generally 
study higher levels of aggregate data from an index and then control for a multitude of variables 
including GDP, policy barriers, imitative ability, etc. (Falvey 2009). Scholars then might isolate 
a target industry they are interested in, like pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, or high-end 
technology. For example, knowledge intensive industries like the phone industry has a stronger 
relationship with growing IPR because they rely more on patents to protect their cutting-edge 
products. Manufacturing or textile industries have weaker relationships with IPR because of the 
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high saturation of those markets (Doanh 2007). This specification tends to lower the level of 
aggregation in the data IPR scholars use (Smith 2002). Thus, the more specifications that IPR 
scholars use in their analysis, the lower their aggregation of data tends to be.  
The research in this thesis differs from the current literature in several ways. The 
important differences include the time period and indexes used for IPR data. The current 
literature on IPR has a plethora of studies that use IPR indexes synthesizing data from many 
countries, controlling for imitative ability, GDP, R&D expenditure, industry, etc. I intent to 
include as many of those control variables as is available to me. As I’ve mentioned, the most 
notable IPR index is from Ginarte and Park (1997). The reason I am not using that index is 
because it is already more than twenty years old and my purpose for this thesis is to update the 
current literature with the most current and reliable data to see if the trends that previous scholars 
discovered hold true as time progresses. The time period for the current literature is either a 
specific year, or several decades in the late 20th century. This thesis will use data from 2017, the 
most recent trade and IPR data that I have encountered in a study. Even though I’m choosing a 
different index and time period, one important similarity is that for trade data I intend to use a 
high level of aggregation consisting of country-level import data which is consistent with the 
current literature.  
Even though I was unable to find data on the industry level, there have been several 
studies that have touched upon how the strength of the relationship between IPR and bilateral 
trade varies among industries which is important to note. The knowledge-intensive industries 
like computers, phones, and pharmaceuticals require large R&D investments to be competitive, 
creating new technologies and cutting-edge products constantly. Similarly, these industries rely 
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on IPR to offset the costs of producing such new technology and the processes for making them. 
If their competitors could instantly reproduce their new ideas, then the creators would lose 
money from the time and effort it took to actualize their ideas. Industry-level data is harder to 
obtain from government databases and is further limited in the most current datasets in the World 
Bank. Even though I am unable to separate imports by industry, I will be including this in my 
discussion of possible future research. Overall, the variation between industry imports can help 
better understand the current state of how IPR affects Sino-US trade.  
This lower level of aggregation and industry specification brings up questions such as: 
does increasing Intellectual Property Rights benefit domestic or foreign firms more? How does 
the strength of a country’s legal system affect its imports? In a country with strong imitative 
ability, does the market expansion effect of IPR remain stronger for high-end technology firms? 
What significance do the results have for the current state of Sino-US trade relations? These are 
the driving questions of my research which looks to analyze the impact strengthening IPR laws 
and legal environment have on country’s imports. This update to the current literature will aid in 
the complex relationship between business and government. So far, scholars have determined 
IPR has a complicated relationship with trade, the direction and strength being highly 
circumstantial. IPR can have both positive and negative relationships with various economic 
variables, categorized by the market power and expansion effects. I intend to test how those 
effects play out in the 21st century.  
V. Theory/Hypothesis 
The specific variables I want to focus on in this thesis are legal environment (IV1), IPR 
strength (IV2), and imports (DV), the independent and dependent variables respectively, which 
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will be framed using the market power and expansion effects. When a firm prepares to start 
selling a new product or use a newly developed technology, the first thing executives can seek is 
a patent to protect their Intellectual Property and shield the huge R&D investments they made 
from the risk of becoming wasted. Patents and other Intellectual Property Rights give firms the 
ability to sell their products more freely because IPR provides firms with a legal channel to 
prosecute intellectual property theft claims as well as promulgates a strong deterrent from 
copying others’ commercial ideas within a society. This relationship is actualized when a country 
enforces its Intellectual Property Rights. If a government signs a strong new law into existence, 
but lacks proper implementation efforts afterwards, the law’s effects will not be as significant. 
On the other hand, a strong law with strict enforcement can perpetuate significant changes in 
how a society functions. Therefore, I contend that IPR strength and enforcement plays a key role 
in international trade. When a firm applies for a patent and is granted the legal protection from 
intellectual property theft, a reasonable person would expect that the respective government will 
have institutions and accessible resources for firms to pursue proper litigation of intellectual 
property theft claims. That theory will be the basis for how my independent variables, legal 
environment and IPR strength, are measured. This enforcement component will be incorporated 
along with other legal structures in measuring the overall strength of a country’s legal 
environment while IPR strength will integrate the existence of some IPR laws, their 
comprehensiveness, and how they compare to international standards like those put forward by 
the WTO and TRIPS. Chinese IPR strength, enforcement, and Sino-US trade are arguably the 
most imperative variables in this intersection between politics and business; the variation in this 
relationship offers valuable insight into how my research design will address the relationship. 
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With an established legal channel and investigative initiative, a firm’s success due to 
engagement or lack of participation in Intellectual Property Rights can also have varying degrees 
which should be considered in my research. A firm can theoretically take advantage of the 
temporary monopoly gained by Intellectual Property Rights and utilize either the market power 
or market expansion effects explained previously. However, without legal protections from 
intellectual property theft, a firm is exposed and vulnerable to predatory companies that intend to 
copy other firms’ innovations for their own commercial gain. This theft can lead to unfair 
competition and the inability of a firm to compete with companies’ lower prices because they 
didn’t need to make a huge investment into R&D to develop the product. Thus, Intellectual 
Property Rights is logically connected with exports and imports through an enforcement 
mechanism. Measuring enforcement will be explained further in my research design where I will 
integrate it into the legal environment variable. Having established some theoretical background 
to the relationship between legal environment, IPR strength, and international trade, I intend to 
use two similar theories to the current literature in my analysis of this relationship: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): In a comparison of countries, increasing the strength of the legal 
environment will result in an increase of imports to those countries.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In a comparison of countries, increasing the strength of Intellectual 
Property Rights protection will result in an increase of imports to those countries.  
Variation in this relationship can first be illustrated by how IPR laws are “strong”, what 
does a strong legal environment look like in society, as well as the varying degrees of firm’s 
output after attaining intellectual property protections; all of which could impact the constantly 
shifting relationship between the Chinese and US governments. Strong IPR can be measured by 
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content analysis of patent laws’ comprehensiveness and alignment with international standards. 
In addition, some scholars use the number of patents filed for a specific country as a proxy 
variable to indicate the growing strength of their IPR regime. For example, in order to receive a 
patent, under Chinese Patent Law, the invention or technology must contain something of 
“novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability” (Shang-jin 2010). Novelty is described as a 
characteristic of technology or an idea that has not been developed or seen in publications 
domestically and abroad, has not been known in the public domain, and has not been filed 
previously (Shang-jin 2010). This concept of “novelty” is a rather comprehensive idea, even 
standalone, because of its incorporation of foreign public domains as well as domestic 
knowledge in China. In my research I intend to capture the increasing comprehensiveness and 
specificity of IPR as well as a country’s steady alignment with international standards by using 
an updated and current IPR index which incorporates the aforementioned concept of what IPR 
strength is. The measurement of the independent variable will be explained further in the 
research design section.  
The degree of enforcement and overall legal environment in China is a second key 
mechanism and intervening variable for how IPR could potentially impact trade flow. If a firm 
has a patent, discovers other companies are using their technology, and files suit against them, 
only with trained judges and lawyers can there be an effective litigation of the claim. If a firm 
wins a case, Chinese authorities must enforce the decision to punish wrongdoers and effect 
change in firms’ operations. Certain institutions and legal infrastructures such as specialized IP 
courts and government patent offices that facilitate IP theft litigations and punishments are 
essential in manifesting a relationship between IPR laws and trade flows. Besides having a 
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proper legal channel to prosecute IP theft claims, police and other authorities can take an active 
initiative into investigating possible IPR violations which would only increase substantially the 
level of IPR enforcement in Chinese society. This mediating variable I call “legal environment” 
will have to be examined in my research to capture the relationship between IPR and Sino-US 
trade accurately.  
VI.  Research Design 
a. Large-N Quantitative Cross-country Analysis 
In order to answer my research questions, test my two hypotheses, and consider all 
important variations I intend to utilize data from 2017 to carry out a large-N quantitative cross-
country analysis of legal environment, IPR strength, and imports to address Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
and Hypothesis 2 (H2). This high level of aggregation will grant insight into the current 
relationship between IPR and trade in a broad context. For this analysis I will not be following 
previous scholars that have used the Gravity Equation and several indexes, most notably the 
Ginarte and Park (1997) IPR index, to analyze IPR with various dependent variables in 
numerous countries (Awokuse 2010a, 2015, Falvey 2009). In my quantitative analysis I will be 
using previous theories on IPR and trade to update the existing literature, seeing if there are any 
significant differences or similarities with earlier scholars’ results discussed in the literature 
review. A more current Property Rights Index will be used instead of Ginarte and Park’s index in 
order to update the current literature on IPR with the most recent and robust data available.  I 
will be performing bivariate and multivariate regressions instead of the Gravity Equation because 
I am unable to obtain all the necessary data to calculate that equation. I will strengthen my 
analysis with as many control variables as available to me consistent with the relevant IPR 
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literature. This extension of previous scholarship of Intellectual Property Rights’ impact on trade 
allows me to place the Sino-US relationship into a larger narrative of IPR.  
In order to operationalize and measure my independent variables, legal environment and 
IPR strength, I will use Property Rights Alliance’s International Property Rights index. This IPR 
index, which contains data from 129 countries, 94% of the world’s population, and 98% of the 
world’s GDP, is necessary to perform bivariate and multivariate regressions. Their reports are 
from every year from 2007 to 2019. Their “Legal & Political Environment” component will be 
used to represent my first independent variable, legal environment. My second independent 
variable will be measured using the IPRI’s “Intellectual Property Rights” component which is 
split up into patent protection and copyright piracy. However, I only have complete access to 
their 2017-2019 datasets. To have a clear picture of how Property Rights Alliance’s IPR index is 
constructed, please see Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4: Web Diagram and Equation of Property Rights Alliance’s International Property 
Rights Index (IPRI) 
 
 
Source: International Property Rights Index 2019 Report 
The Legal & Political Environment component of the IPRI index consists of four 
categories: (1) Judicial Independence, (2) Rule of Law, (3) Political Stability, and (4) Control of 
Corruption. The IPRI index took the Global Competitiveness index from the World Economic 
Forum’s 2018 report. The questions for this category include: In your country, how independent 
is the judicial system from influences of the government, individuals or companies? The Rule of 
Law component measures whether individuals believe and support the rules of their society, 
Chester 22 
 
specifically contract enforcement, property rights, police, likelihood of crime and violence, and 
the courts. The IPRI index sourced the Rule of Law and the Political Stability component from 
the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Political Stability increases incentives to 
own and pursue ownership and management of property. Thus, the less politically stable a 
country is the less likely citizens will pursue property and have trust in their government not to 
violate their rights. The Control of Corruption component combines several indicators from the 
same source to evaluate the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (IPRI 
Index Report 2017). 
The Intellectual Property Rights component of the index is comprised of three categories: 
(1) Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, (2) Patent Protection, and (3) Copyright Piracy. 
The first category of the IPR component is comprised of survey data from the World Economic 
forum and the World Bank Enterprise surveys which contain questions such as: in your country, 
to what extent are Intellectual Property Rights protected? Respondents are given a scale of 1-7 to 
answer, 7 being extremely protected. The second source comes from evaluating countries’ IPR 
laws for their coverage of subject matter, membership in international treaties, restrictions on 
patent rights, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. These are scored on a scale 
from 1-5, 5 being the strongest. Coverage of subject matter is scored based on whether a country 
covers the following areas: pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food, surgical products, microorganisms, 
utility models, software, plant and animal varieties, etc. Membership in international treaties 
includes the Paris Accords, Patent Cooperation Treaty, Protection of New Varieties (UPOV), 
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits), Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Enforcement mechanisms include preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions, contributory infringement, 
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and burden of proof reversals. Restrictions on patent rights include working requirements, 
compulsory licensing, and revocation of patents for violations (Park 2008). The third source the 
IPR component synthesizes IPR theft rates in each country from BSA Global Software Survey. 
These three sources are combined to create their IPR component of the index and will be used to 
measure my second independent variable, IPR strength. 
  This measure for legal environment and IPR strength will be paired with another large-n 
database’s trade data, the World Bank. This organization has data open to the public dating back 
to the 1960’s. But, for my research purposes I am only interested in their data that overlaps with 
Property Right Alliances’ IPRI index for the past couple years. Unfortunately, the World Bank’s 
trade data is incomplete for 2018 and 2019 with most countries not reporting data, thus I am 
restricted to using 2017 as the year for my regression analysis. 2017 is the only year that has 
complete data from both the IPRI index and the World Bank trade data. I will be using the World 
Bank’s “World Development Indicators” catalog which contains import data measured as the 
total products and services imported using US$ 2010 constant. 
With the more common higher levels of aggregation, the analysis of IPR is 
overwhelmingly dominated by using variations of the gravity equation for international trade. 
The gravity equation is a robust empirical tool used to analyze more than one country’s trade. 
The gravity equation holds that trade between countries is proportional to their sizes, measured 
by GDP, and inversely proportional to the distance between the two countries (see equation 
below). Scholars have made variations of this well-founded equation to fit their analysis of IPR 
and how it affects international trade. Some variables scholars may add to their gravity equation 
include ex-colony status, common border, and language (Doanh 2007). After having established 
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the imitative effect is a determinant of the market power or expansion effect, scholars have added 
imitative ability to their modified equation which started with Smith (2001) (Awokuse 2015).  
Gravity Equation: (most simplified form) 
 
The variable Mij is bilateral imports by country i (China) from exporter country j. The variables 
Yi and Yj are the incomes (proxied by GDP) for countries. Y
w is world income and tij is the 
bilateral trade resistance term (measured as one plus the ad valorem trade cost) for trade between 
countries i and j. Furthermore, the parameter σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between 
different goods. Pi and Pj are the Dixit-Stiglitz CES consumer price indices for countries i and j 
(Awokuse 2010). Scholars like Awokuse, Smith, and Falvey use variations of the gravity 
equation to fit their specific theories. I am diverging from the current literature in this aspect 
because I am not using the gravity equation and instead doing a regression analysis. The data 
available to me that I have been able to find is not enough to perform the gravity equation. I do 
not have access to the bilateral trade resistance term and the elasticity of substitution. 
Additionally, I am more confident in my ability to produce a strong statistical analysis using 
bivariate and multivariate regressions. To my understanding, the control variables used for these 
analyses include GDP, regional effects, population, and democracy so I will be using the same 
control variables. This is a limitation of my study because a multivariate/bivariate regression 
may not be as strong of an analysis as other scholars’ versions of the gravity equation; however, 
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my study makes up for this weakness by using an updated Property Rights index that includes 
more comprehensive factors than previous indexes and more recent data from 2017.   
b. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The reasons why this analysis provides such strong insight into IPR mechanisms that 
affect Sino-US trade are because this research design utilizes strong robust statistical analysis of 
the most current and reliable data available. This research design is extremely comprehensive in 
its breadth and scope. By first updating previous scholars’ research with a cross-country analysis 
of Intellectual Property Rights’ impact on international trade with the most recent data available, 
an overarching trend or relationship will become clear. Either this will reinforce the past theories 
surrounding IPR or it will provide important differences in which I will address in the discussion 
section. With this research, I am placing more importance on gathering a breadth of data from 
countries dealing with Intellectual Property Rights to better explain how Sino-US trade relations 
have been impacted by China’s evolving IPR strength. With an overarching trend and deep 
insight into firm level experiences, policy makers and firm executives will benefit from this 
research into an important relationship between businesses and governments.  
Even though this research presents an opportunity to expand upon previous research, a 
problematic issue is how valid or precise data is from Chinese and US sources including the 
discrepancies in reporting trade volume. I plan on paying close attention to conflicting data 
which could hurt the validity of this analysis. Despite the possibility for contradictions in data for 
the US and China who are competing for the position as the world’s hegemon, it would be 
unsurprising that data on both sides could be inaccurate and inflated. Cross-referencing data on 
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trade and for the firms will be essential in reinforcing the accuracy of the data I plan on 
collecting.  
VII. Data Analysis  
I compiled my dataset from the several internationally recognized sources. I collected and 
self-entered import, GDP, and population data from the World Bank’s data catalog “World 
Development Indicators” (WDI) which compiles data from internationally recognized sources to 
present current and accurate global development data. I sourced Intellectual Property Right and 
legal environment strength data from the International Property Rights Index which is comprised 
of those two indexes plus physical property rights (PPR). I coded the countries available from the 
IPR index into different regions according to the United Nations Country Grouping. I also 
collected Political Rights and Civil Liberties data to act as a control for democracy from the 
Freedom House Reports. After compiling my data set, I had to choose 2017 as the year I would 
focus my analysis on because of data restrictions. The World Bank (WDI) data catalog only had 
a small selection of countries for 2019 and 2018. Additionally, the International Property Rights 
Index only made their data public from 2017-2019, the previous reports did not contain tables 
with all the data available.  
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The dependent variable is each country’s imports for 2017, measured by the total value of 
goods and services in constant 2010 US$. Initially this data was in dollars, but I had to convert it 
to millions, billions, then finally trillions to get coefficients that were easier to understand and 
graph. Specifically, for Figure 5 which is a scatter plot showing the positive correlation between 
imports and IPR strength, the log of the import data had to be taken in order to see the correlation 
more clearly. The datapoints were so close together before taking the log, it was unclear what the 
significance of the graph was.  
Figure 5: Scatter Plot of 2017 IPR Strength vs Import(log) 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
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The independent variables for my two hypotheses are the strength of a country’s legal 
environment and Intellectual Property Rights, measured by two components of the International 
Property Rights Index. For how the Intellectual Property Rights and Legal Environment 
component of the IPRI index are measured, please see the research design. Compiling this data 
was particularly tedious as the reports were only available in pdf format and I could not copy and 
paste the data straight into excel so I had to manually enter the data. As shown in Figure 6 below, 
and outlined in red, China is ranked in the 3rd quintile among other countries’ IPRI score. The 
third quintile includes the top 60% of countries in Property Right Alliance’s index. The United 
States, outlined in blue, is ranked in the top 20% of countries. The highest ranked IPRI score 
belongs to New Zealand and the lowest ranked score belongs to the Republic of Yemen. Table 1 
details the summary statistics and Table 2 details the definition and source of variables.  
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Figure 6: 2017 IPRI Report Quintile Rankings of Countries 
 
Source: 2017 IPRI Report 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Import 121 .19 .399 .002 3.07 
IPR 127 5.503 1.651 1.707 8.715 
Legal 127 5.171 1.827 1.679 9.031 
PPR 127 6.227 1.366 3.26 8.826 
IPRI 127 5.634 1.501 2.728 8.634 
GDP (log) 127 6.16e+11 1.92e+12 2.32e+09 1.73e+13 
Population (log) 127 5.51e+07 1.74e+08 343000 1.39e+09 
Region 128 3.508 2.227 1 9 
Political Rights 128 3.227 2.086 1 7 
Civil Liberties 128 3.148 1.721 1 7 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
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I considered a series of control variables to support my analysis including GDP, 
population size, region, and democracy. The GDP data was measured in $US dollars and had to 
be logged in order to provide clearer results; the same situation for the population size which was 
measured in singular individuals. The different regions that I included according to the United 
Nations Country Grouping are as follows: Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, Middle East, 
North America, Oceania, South America, and The Caribbean. The democracy control variables 
include the Political Rights Index and the Civil Liberties Index from Freedom House. Freedom 
house uses a combination of field research, local interviews, news articles, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and regional specialists that go over the analysts’ results. Each country is 
scored 0-4 points for each of the 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. A 
score of 0 signifies the smallest degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. For 
Political Rights questions there are three categories: (1) Electoral Process (3 questions), (2) 
Political Pluralism and Participation (4 questions), and (3) Functioning of Government (3 
questions). The Civil Liberties questions are grouped into 4 categories: (1) Freedom of 
Expression and Belief (4 Questions), (2) Associational and Organizational Rights (3 questions), 
(3) Rule of Law (4 questions), and (4) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4 questions). 
See appendix for the specific questions asked.  
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Table 2: Variable Definition and Source 
Variable Definition Source 
International 
Property 
Rights Index 
The Index measures the strength of physical property rights, 
intellectual property rights, and the legal and political 
environments that enforce them. IPR index 
IPR 
The Intellectual Property Rights component evaluates the 
protection of this kind property. In addition to an opinion-based 
measure, it assesses protection of two major forms of intellectual 
property rights (patents and copyrights) from a de jure and a de 
facto perspective. IPR index 
Legal 
Environment 
The Legal and Political Environment component grasps the ability 
of a nation to enforce a de jure system of property rights. It 
comprises four (4) elements: the independence of its judicial 
system, the strength of the rule of law, the control of corruption, 
and the stability of its political system. IPR index 
PPR 
A strong property rights regime promotes the confidence of people 
in its effectiveness to protect private property rights. It also 
provides for integrated transactions related to tj he registry of 
property, and it allows access to the required credit to convert 
property into capital. IPR index 
GDP (log) 
Gross Domestic Product measures the total value of all goods and 
services produced in a country during a single year, in log form World Bank 
Population 
(log) 
Population is the number of people residing in the country, in log 
form World Bank 
Region Region is the area of the world in which that country resides  
UN Region 
classification 
  Africa (1)   
  Asia (2)   
  Central America (3)   
  Europe (4)   
  Middle East (5)   
  North America (6)   
  Oceania (7)   
  South America (8)   
  The Caribbean (9)   
Political 
Rights Index 
Evaluates a country's electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government 
Freedom 
House 
Civil Liberties 
Index 
Evaluates a country's freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, their rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights to create an index 
Freedom 
House 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
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I first performed the bivariate analysis where I regress the dependent variable against key 
independent variables and report the results in Table 3. The coefficients for IPR, legal 
environment, and the International Property Rights Index are all reported positive and 
statistically significant across all model specifications. The coefficient for IPR is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that higher IPR score is associated with more imports. More 
specifically, in the bivariate model, imports increase 120 billion $US (2010) for every 1 point 
gained on the IPR scale. In addition, the R-squared test also presents significant change from the 
bivariate to multivariate model. As seen in the bivariate table, the R-squared test is equal to 0.24 
which means that the bivariate model can attest for around 24% of the effect on imports. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Bivariate Regression results  
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
 IPR 0.120*** 0.121***     
   (0.020) (0.020)     
 legal   0.075*** 0.074***   
     (0.019) (0.019)   
 IPRI      0.114*** 0.115*** 
       (0.022) (0.023) 
 Constant -0.476*** -
0.469*** 
-0.200* -0.204* -
0.455*** 
-
0.450*** 
   (0.114) (0.118) (0.105) (0.111) (0.132) (0.134) 
 Obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 R-squared  0.240 0.240 0.117 0.117 0.179 0.179 
Regional Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Source: Author’s Dataset 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table 4:  Multivariate Regression results  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
              
 IPR 0.089*** 0.088***     
   (0.024) (0.025)     
 legal   0.078*** 0.077***   
     (0.022) (0.024)   
 IPRI     0.088*** 0.087*** 
       (0.026) (0.027) 
 GDP (Log) 0.052** 0.053* 0.053** 0.054** 0.056** 0.058** 
   (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
 Population (Log) 0.082*** 0.081** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.090*** 0.087** 
   (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.035) 
 Political Rights 0.062** 0.061* 0.063** 0.063* 0.065** 0.064** 
   (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
 Civil Liberties -0.072* -0.072* -0.077* -0.077* -0.083** -0.082* 
   (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
 Constant -2.948*** -2.949*** -3.271*** -3.271*** -3.150*** -3.153*** 
   (0.761) (0.760) (0.799) (0.802) (0.784) (0.785) 
 Obs. 119 119 119 119 119 119 
 R-squared  0.483 0.483 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.474 
Regional Fixed 
Effect 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Source: Author’s Dataset 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results for the multivariate model regressions are reported in table 4. It should be noted that 
the coefficient for IPR changes in the multivariate model when all the controls are added. The 
multivariate model says that for every one-point increase on the IPR scale, a country’s imports 
increase on average about 88 billion US$ 2010. In comparison, increasing 1-point on the legal 
environment scale shows an average increase of about 77 billion US$ in imports; This effect is 
about 10 billion less than IPR’s effect on imports. Additionally, the effect of IPR strength on 
imports according to the R-squared test statistic accounts for about 48% of the variability of the 
data around its mean.  
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 Seeing that China and the US have much higher imports than my regression equation 
predicts, I preformed additional regression analysis without Chinese and US data to see if the 
significant and positive relationship still exists without the Sino-US relationship present in the 
dataset. The results for this analysis are reported in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. It is important 
to note that the bivariate and multivariate results without China and the US are both positive and 
statistically significant. The IPR coefficient is reported as an average increase of $95 billion in 
imports per point increase in IPR in the bivariate results and $74 billion in the multivariate 
results. The Legal coefficient is reported as an average increase of $63 billion in imports per 
point increase in Legal score and $62 billion in the multivariate model. Lastly, the IPRI index’s 
coefficient is reported as an average increase of $90 billion in imports per point increase in the 
entire index score and $70 billion in the multivariate model. Comparing this analysis with my 
original analysis which included China and the US, the results without the Sino-US relationship 
show positive and statistically significant coefficients for IPR, Legal, and IPRI that are smaller 
on average.  
 Since the results from my quantitative cross-country analysis of the effect of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Legal environment on a country’s imports show positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, they support both of my hypotheses that increasing IPR and Legal 
strength will lead to an increase in imports. Additionally, these results support that on average 
increasing IPR strength can be associated with a market expansion effect and supports Smith 
(2000, 2001) and Awokuse (2010) in their analysis of market expansion and market power 
effects specifically in China. 
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VIII. Discussion 
My research results update the current literature by using data pulled from 2017, the most 
recent study done on IPR that I have found. Awokuse (2010a) specifically studies the effect of 
strengthening patent laws which led to an increase in imports for China. The effect observed was 
particularly strong for knowledge-intensive products. Awokuse was able to procur industry level 
data that I was not and was therefore able to analyze IPR’s effect on specific industries. My 
research supports the overall trend that increasing IPR strength increases imports in broader and 
even more comprehensive ways, further strengthening Awokuses and other researchers’ findings. 
Awokuse used 36 countries which consisted of 21 OECD countries and the rest non-OECD 
countries, focusing specifically on China’s import levels. My cross-country analysis used IPR 
and import data from over 100 countries and still observed comparable results suggesting that 
this association of IPR and imports can be extended to more than just China and the other 
countries Awokuse included. It would be interesting to see in the future if more recent industry-
level data becomes available that the same effect will be observed in our constantly changing 
world. One important difference between our studies is that Awokuse used the number of foreign 
patent applications as a proxy for IPR strength under the assumption that more applications and 
patents would be because their IPR system is getting better. My research model used an IPR 
index that combined both data from patents and copyrights to calculate a country’s score. This 
means that my results include more aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and shows positive 
and significant results for a wide range of countries. 
Another prominent researcher of IPR, Smith (2001, 2002), found that stronger foreign 
patent rights lead to an increase in US drug exports, the market expansion effect, to countries 
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with strong imitative ability and decrease exports to countries with weak imitative ability, 
consistent with the market power effect. China is considered as a country with strong imitative 
ability and thus would experience a market expansion effect of imports. Smith’s studies are 
consistent with my results in that market expansion effect is observed more than the market 
power effect. However, Smith in her 2002 study focused specifically on biological products, 
medicinal, botanicals, and pharmaceuticals whereas my research is not industry specific. These 
industries fall into the knowledge-intensive category that other researchers find to have a positive 
relationship with IPR strength.  
Some specific results that I found to be unexpected are in the multivariate regression 
analysis, the Civil Liberties control variable has a negative coefficient and the Political Rights 
variable has a positive coefficient and are both statistically significant, though not as significant 
as my independent variables. The Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes are on a number 
scale with 1 being the strongest individual rights and liberties. This led me to believe that both 
control variables would have negative coefficients when regressed with imports. This 
observation would need additional analysis, possibly for a future study, whether political rights 
for individuals have any influence on the imports of a country.  
Seeing that the positive and statistically significant relationship between imports and a 
country’s IPR and Legal Environment stays positive and significant when the Sino-US 
relationship is excluded, the data can speak to this important economic relationship as well. The 
initial scatter plot shows China and the US as having much higher import levels than the line of 
best fit. This observation suggests that the regression results containing the Sino-US relationship 
may be skewed. However, because the same relationship is maintained without the Sino-US 
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relationship, my results remain statistically significant and impact both China and the US. My 
regression results including the Sino-US trade relationship predict that China’s imports will 
increase $88 billion dollars in 2010 USD if they increase their IPR score 1 point. My regression 
results without the Sino-US relationship predict that a country’s imports will increase $74 billion 
2010 USD. It’s possible that the Sino-US relationship is responsible for the $14 billion 
difference in these regression results.  
My results add to this literature that the overall legal environment is also associated with 
an increase in imports which I have not seen in IPR literature thus far. This means that as China 
expands its legal system to include more IPR courts with trained lawyers and judges in this 
specific area of law, they will see more international corporations want to sell their products and 
services in China. My assumption is that these firms are more confident in the Chinese legal 
system as it grows to handle IPR theft situations correctly and timely. If time permitted, my 
original thesis plan was to incorporate firm-level case studies that explore this idea more in 
depth. However, I was unable to find enough data and put together a strong case study to add. 
Even though I had to cut the second part of my thesis, the results of my quantitative 
cross-country analysis point to a significant trend that could affect both international and 
domestic businesses in different ways. Knowing that an increase in the strength of a country’s 
IPR laws and legal environment results in an average increase in imports, international 
businesses can use this knowledge to factor in where they choose to do business or not to. If an 
international business is operating in China right now selling computer chips and the company 
lawyers or employees notice the Chinese government is revamping a part of their IPR structure, 
my research shows that if the change would increase the strength of their IPR laws according to 
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the IPRI index, then the business should prepare for an increase in imports to the Chinese 
market. My results do not show which imports specifically will increase or from which 
international actors, nonetheless a company should take those changes into account when 
deciding how to operate in the near future. From previous research, changes in IPR law effects 
knowledge-intensive industries more so than others, which would mean the computer chip 
company might see increased competition from other knowledge-intensive industries or have the 
opportunity to increase their own exports to China. These implications are speculative examples 
and would be better supported with future firm-level case studies done on individual firms. 
However, it is important for businesses to consider how an increase in imports could affect their 
particular situations. Domestic businesses could have entirely different experiences with the 
increasing strength of their own country’s IPR and legal environment strength. Depending on the 
domestic company’s industry, an increase in IPR strength and the resulting increase in imports 
could provide the domestic company with better protection for its own technology and 
information; however, an increase in imports could mean increased and possibly unwanted 
competition from powerful international corporations. 
An increase in imports has implications for country’s governments as well, if they change 
their IPR laws or legal environment they need to prepare for an increase in imports or create 
policies and structures that will restrict or support an influx of imports. An increase in imports 
due to the expansion of import quotas can have a negative impact on domestic producers because 
of resulting lower domestic prices and production (Kennedy 2009). That potential impact on 
domestic businesses needs to be addressed by governments who are inclined to support their 
country’s firms. Knowing that IPR, legal environment, and a country’s imports are connected 
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with a positive relationship, governments can predict more accurately how much their market’s 
imports could increase on average when they implement improvements to their legal system. 
Government leaders can therefore prepare for the inevitable influx of imports, proactively 
choosing whether they want to support this increase or restrict it with quotas, tariffs, and other 
trade barriers.  
This relationship between IPR, legal environment, and imports only points to an average 
increase in imports, each country will have a different experience, especially China. The Chinese 
economy is an export-growth based economy whose growth rate has slowed in the most recent 
decade; however, with the continued implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, China may 
continue to expand its exports along those newly constructed trade routes (Athukorala 2017). 
Along with China’s economic growth and recent slow-down, they have joined the World Trade 
Organization and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement which 
both required China to strengthen their Intellectual Property Right legislation to satisfy 
international standards (Li 2015). According to my research results, China should continue to 
experience increased levels of imports if they continue to expand their IPR protections and 
enforcement.  
The US on the other hand is a major influencer upon less developed countries to 
implement and enforce higher standards in IPR laws. This influence, according to my research in 
addition to previous IPR literature may be because increasing the strength of IPR laws leads to 
more imports in any given country’s market, without the interference of tariffs, quotas, and other 
trade barriers. The US has been pressuring specifically China to address the high levels of IP 
theft and technology theft reported by US companies in China (Chen 2014). This pressure and 
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changes to Chinese IPR legislation if following the trend my research points to, China will 
experience a growth in imports. This may be beneficial for the US and other western nations 
looking to turn the balance on Chinese import competition who can take advantage of this trend. 
However, less developed countries may not benefit from such a shock to their market. Less 
developed nations could face unfair competition from large multinational corporations who 
monopolize less developed nations’ markets (Chang 2009). For that reason, these nations might 
impose high tariffs, quotas, and huge protections for their domestic businesses to shield them 
from international competition. For the US, focusing on China’s growth in IPR strength could 
benefit their trade relationship in the long-term. 
The US and Chinese economies are interdependent yet currently at odds because of the 
US’ slow decline as the world hegemon, a process highlighted by the Sino-US trade war and IPR 
being just one thread in this complex and perpetually shifting relationship. IPR is one current 
source of tension between the US and Chinese government that according to the current literature 
and my research results could influence the US trade deficit with China. Unfortunately, my 
research results cannot predict whether increasing IPR and legal environment strength will 
balance the trade deficit, nor does it predict what future tariffs, quotas, and other trade barriers 
will be at play. My research suggests that the strength of China’s IPR and legal environment can 
be associated with increased imports without other variables changing or impacting the 
relationship. Perhaps this trend will result in a pressure on the Chinese market to allow for more 
imports; however, the Chinese government can block this pressure from having any real change. 
For the future of the Sino-US trade relationship, IPR will continue to provide an avenue for 
diplomacy as I have shown its importance to bilateral trade. 
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After interpreting and discussing implications of my research, I offer some policy 
suggestions for both the US and Chinese governments to reduce tensions and work towards 
cooperative economic benefit. First, in current times the Coronavirus pandemic overshadows the 
economic tensions in the Sino-US trade relationship. However, after this crisis subsides and the 
two economies recover, the trade deficit and IPR factor will still be relevant. Thus, I offer some 
suggestions of waiting until after the pandemic and economic recovery to bring both leaders 
together to have an open discussion about fair and equal trade. If the US’ goal is to restrict 
China’s growth, US government leaders should closely track the status of the Belt and Road 
initiative projects and investments. Additionally, the US could continue to use outside pressure 
including the World Trade Organization, TRIPS, and other international 
agreements/organizations to pressure China into expediting its IPR growth. 
To accompany a cross-country analysis of IPR’s current impact on international trade, a 
possible future study, given the availability of data, would be to analyze Chinese IPR strength’s 
relationship with Sino-US trade by conducting firm level case studies of the Chinese company 
Huawei and the US company Boeing. My original thesis plan was going to include qualitative 
case studies; however, due to time constraints, lack of available data, and other circumstantial 
factors I was unable to produce significant enough case studies to include in this thesis. Despite 
the limitations, I will provide this as a suggestion for a future researcher to use. Previous 
scholarship surrounding IPR has been floating at remarkably high levels of aggregation, which 
loses important details from the decision makers involved in both Intellectual Property Rights 
and trade. Policies have significant economic impact, but firms are ultimately the entities 
deciding whether to increase or decrease exports and imports. In addition, broad scope analyses 
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of IPR and trade are useful for generalizability and being able to see trends that are not bound by 
one country’s situation. However, in order to explain the variations found in previous 
scholarship, one could look at firm level data that potentially explains with greater detail the 
impact IPR has on Sino-US trade.  
IX. Conclusion  
This thesis aimed to understand deeper the economic relationship between the US and 
China through Intellectual Property Rights as the mechanism that operates between the two. My 
main research questions were targeted at discovering how IPR influences bilateral trade between 
countries. Based on my quantitative cross-country study of over 100 countries using bivariate 
and multivariate regression analysis, taking into consideration the current literature, my 
conclusion is that IPR laws and the strength of a country’s legal environment has a considerable 
effect on the amount of imports a country receives. Both an increase in IPR strength and legal 
environment can be associated with an increase in imports, although IPR has a larger effect than 
legal environment.  
China and the US have been experiencing increased tensions in the past decade in part 
due to the US’ relative power decreasing in the international order, the enormous trade deficit 
between US and China, and China’s continued expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The US seems to be acting on these tensions by engaging in a trade war with China and 
addressing other trade-related practices through international organizations to rebalance the 
situation and contain Chinese growth. To understand these tensions and the shifts in power 
relations, my thesis looks at one major point of contention between the two countries which I 
theorized would have a considerable impact on the Sino-US trade relationship, Intellectual 
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Property Rights. US companies have reported a high frequency of Intellectual Property theft in 
China by domestic Chinese firms which has been taken up by US diplomacy with China. The US 
has been putting pressure on China and even have submitted a complaint to the WTO about 
China’s subpar IPR practices. It should be noted that Chinese IPR was only created in 1980’s 
and has continued to develop and increase in strength since then. China has been able to satisfy 
international standards and join the WTO and other international organizations in such a short 
time. Nonetheless, China’s IPR system still has a lot of room for improvement considering they 
are one of the world’s largest economies.  
Previous scholarship on IPR has shown that there is a considerable impact on 
international trade in various forms including but not limited to: exports, imports, FDI, 
innovation, licensing, etc. Most notably is that knowledge intensive industries experience the 
strongest impact from changes in IPR strength. My research was not industry specific, but it 
serves as an important update to the current literature and expands the comprehensiveness of 
countries, adds a legal environment variable, and further supports that the market expansion 
effect is on average more frequent than the market power effect. By using the most recent IPR 
and trade data available, my thesis strengthens what is already known about the effects of IPR on 
international trade. It solidifies not only the theory that IPR effect trade, but the overall quality 
and quantity of legal structures, institutions, and enforcement practices also contribute to changes 
in international trade.  
The implications of my research results, as mentioned previously in the discussion 
section, has various impacts on international and domestic businesses, on countries, and on the 
Sino-US trade relationship. For businesses, this knowledge is particularly important for 
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international business who can predict more accurately how their competition in a foreign market 
may fluctuate as they monitor changes in the target country’s IPR and legal system. For domestic 
businesses, they can better prepare and focus on their comparative advantages. Countries who 
are revamping their IPR laws to join international trade organizations or improve their legal 
system can better comprehend how these changes will affect their economies so they can prepare 
tariffs, quotas, and other trade policies to handle the increased pressure for imports. Implications 
for the Sino-US trade relationship are that IPR will continue to be a point of contention between 
the two economic powerhouses and could have a considerable impact on the trade imbalance. 
The US’ pressure on China to increase their IPR strength could alleviate some troubles for US 
companies that are trying to do business there. Overall, the Sino-US trade relationship remains a 
complex and not completely understood web of components, requiring countless future studies 
as more data becomes available; however my thesis adds clarity and joins the current literature in 
pursuing the truth surrounding one of the most important economic relationships in the world.  
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X. Appendix 
Table 5: Bivariate Regression results without China and US  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
          
 IPR 0.094*** 0.096***     
   (0.017) (0.018)     
 Legal   0.063*** 0.063***   
     (0.015) (0.015)   
 IPRI     0.089*** 0.091*** 
       (0.018) (0.019) 
 _cons -0.366*** -0.352*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.352*** -0.341*** 
   (0.081) (0.080) (0.061) (0.061) (0.089) (0.088) 
 Obs. 118 118 118 118 118 118 
 R-squared  0.350 0.353 0.202 0.202 0.266 0.270 
Regional Fixed 
Effect 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Source: Author’s Dataset 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 6: Multivariate Regression results without China and US  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
          
IPR 0.075*** 0.073***     
   (0.018) (0.018)     
Legal   0.063*** 0.061***   
     (0.019) (0.020)   
IPRI     0.071*** 0.069*** 
       (0.021) (0.021) 
GDP (Log) 0.028* 0.033* 0.031* 0.036 0.033* 0.039* 
   (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) 
Population (Log) 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
Political Rights 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.026 0.029* 0.027 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Civil Liberties -0.037 -0.037 -0.042 -0.042 -0.047* -0.046* 
   (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) 
 _cons -1.815*** -1.824*** -2.094*** -2.095*** -1.992*** -1.999*** 
   (0.346) (0.352) (0.381) (0.383) (0.370) (0.373) 
 Obs. 117 117 117 117 117 117 
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 R-squared  0.538 0.541 0.515 0.518 0.514 0.519 
Regional Fixed 
Effect 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Source: Author’s 
Dataset 
Standard errors are 
in parenthesis  
      
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
      
       
 
 
 
 
Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indexes Questions 
POLITICAL RIGHTS (0–40 POINTS)  
ELECTORAL PROCESS (0–12 POINTS) 
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair 
elections? 
2. Did established and reputable national and/or international election monitoring 
organizations judge the most recent elections for head of government to be free and fair? 
(Note: Heads of government chosen through various electoral frameworks, including 
direct elections for president, indirect elections for prime minister by parliament, and the 
electoral college system for electing presidents, are covered under this and the following 
subquestions. In cases of indirect elections for the head of government, the elections for 
the legislature that chose the head of government, as well as the selection process of the 
head of government himself, should be taken into consideration.) 
3. Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent 
election for head of government? 
4. Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, 
transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner? 
5. Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access 
throughout the campaign free of intimidation? 
1. Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure? 
2. Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure 
or intimidation? 
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3. Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made 
public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing 
parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty? 
4. Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure 
equal representation? 
5. Has a democratically elected head of government who was chosen in the most recent 
election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: Although a peaceful, 
“velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it replaces a 
head of government who was not freely and fairly elected—the new leader has not been 
freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.) 
6. In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other 
subnational officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the 
conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights 
in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights? 
7. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
8. Did established and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring 
organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to be free and fair? 
9. Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent national 
legislative election? 
10. Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, 
and nondiscriminatory manner? 
11. Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout 
the campaign free of intimidation?  
12. Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure? 
13. Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure 
or intimidation? 
14. Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results 
15. made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing 
16. parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty? 
17.  Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure 
equal representation?  
18. Have the representatives of a democratically elected national legislature who were chosen 
in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: 
Although a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—
particularly if it replaces a national legislature whose representatives were not freely and 
fairly elected—members of the new legislature have not been freely and fairly elected 
and cannot be treated as such.) 
19. In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly in 
conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an 
opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of 
political rights?  
20. Are the electoral laws and framework fair? 
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21. Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections? (Note: 
Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an election if the 
ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the election is infringed.) 
22. Are election commissions or other election authorities independent and free from 
government or other pressure and interference?  
23. Is the composition of election commissions fair and balanced? 
24. Do election commissions or other election authorities conduct their work in an effective 
and competent manner? 
25. Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage? (Note: Suffrage can be suspended 
or withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity, such as mental incapacity or conviction of a 
serious criminal offense.) Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and 
nonpartisan manner, as opposed to gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage? 
26. Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as 
proportional versus majoritarian) been manipulated to advance certain political interests 
or to influence the electoral results? 
B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION (0–16 POINTS) 
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings? 
• Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to 
be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, 
excessively large membership requirements, etc.? 
• Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, 
or other peaceful activities? 
• Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or 
subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities? 
6. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to 
increase its support or gain power through elections? 
• Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition 
parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully 
competing in elections? 
• Are there legitimate opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the 
national legislature or in subnational governments? 
• Are opposition party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, 
imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political 
activities? 
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3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful 
group? 
• Do such groups offer bribes to voters and/or political figures in order to influence 
their political choices? 
• Do such groups intimidate, harass, or attack voters and/or political figures in order 
to influence their political choices? 
• Does the military control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government 
policy and activities, including in countries that nominally are under civilian 
control? 
• Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over 
government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign 
military troops, the use of significant economic threats or sanctions, etc.? 
7. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and 
electoral opportunities? 
• Do political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific 
concern to minority groups? 
• Does the government inhibit the participation of minority groups in national or 
subnational political life through laws and/or practical obstacles? 
• Are political parties based on ethnicity, culture, or religion that espouse peaceful, 
democratic values legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate? 
C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT (0–12 POINTS) 
1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives 
determine the policies of the government? 
• Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office? 
• Do other appointed or non–freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent 
freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and 
making meaningful policy decisions? 
•  Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs, the military, and foreign 
governments, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and 
implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions? 
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
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• Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to 
prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflict 
of interest? 
•  Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration 
requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption? 
• Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that 
function without impediment or political pressure or influence? 
• Are allegations of corruption by government officials thoroughly investigated and 
prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents? 
• Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media? 
• Do whistle-blowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy 
legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and 
corruption? 
• What was the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
score for this country? 
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate 
with openness and transparency? 
• Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens able to 
comment on and influence pending policies or legislation? 
•  Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about 
government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it? 
• Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public 
scrutiny? 
• Does the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely 
fashion? 
• Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of 
government contracts?  
• Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media 
scrutiny and verification? 
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